


# **“.local” Server Certificate for HTTPS migration on local network**

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W3C TPAC 2016

# Use Case: Media Cache Server on LAN


- This is one of typical communication models of “Web of Things”, but we can Not realize it.



# Problem Statement

- **Mixed content problem:**

- UA doesn't allow secure origins to access to IoT devices on LAN.
- Because there is no way to issue valid server certificates to the IoT devices.




- **Additional problems in the use case:**

1. The UA doesn't have any ways to find IoT devices on LAN.
2. The user doesn't have an opportunity to authorize a origin to access to an IoT device, and cannot properly judge whether the origin is evil or not.
3. The user authentication on the device must be synchronized with the origin's.


# A Candidate Solution

- UA uses “.local” server certificates for local domains (e.g., media-cache-server.local) only if a user and the UA grant it. The “.local” server certificates probably don't chain up to trusted root CAs.
- UA provides a new API to allow secure origins to access to IoT devices by issuing the .local server certificates and controlling the use of them.



# Requirements for the Browser API

- The API should provide an abstract way to issue .local server certificates to IoT devices based on user authorization and the existence and proximity of the .local domains.
- In addition, the API should provide a one-stop way to realize my User Case.
  - The API can be a simple single API, and also can consist of several primitive APIs




# Additional Advantages

- **The proposed solution can solve the additional problems (slide.4)**
  1. The UA doesn't have any ways to find IoT devices on LAN.  
⇒ **The browser API finds cross-accessible local network devices.**
  2. The user doesn't have an opportunity to authorize a secure origin to access to an IoT device, and cannot properly judge whether the origin is evil or not.  
⇒ **The browser API assures the user authorization.**  
⇒ **evil RPs can be revoked by the local server certificate provider.**
  3. The user authentication on the device must be synchronized with the origin.  
⇒ **If IoT devices has valid server certificates, the devices can be OAuth/OIDC RPs for single sign-on.**

# PoC Implementation built on Web Bluetooth API

- BLE is a candidate underlying protocol as another communication channel for issuing .local server certificates.
- There are several missing parts. e.g., The API has to store and manage .local server certs and private CA certs securely with binding to origins (and users).



# Conclusion and Discussion

- **I proposed a solution to issue valid TLS server certificates to IoT devices.**
  - Does “.local server certificate” sound practical ?
  - Are there any solutions ?
- **On the internet, web services can collaborate with each other in a simple way that is based on public REST APIs and some standard Web technologies (e.g., OAuth, Open ID Connect)**
- **If we can solve the problem, we can expand such kind of collaborations into the world of IoT.**




# **Appendix**


## **The Details of the Proposed Solution**

# A Candidate Solution: Precondition

0-3. register as a Relying Party of local server CA, and get a **Client ID, Secret**



# A Candidate Solution



# A Candidate Solution (cont'd)

it looks like FIDO 2.0 trust model.

